List of all issue types

Here is an overview of the issue types currently reported by Infer.

ARBITRARY_CODE_EXECUTION_UNDER_LOCK

Reported as "Arbitrary Code Execution Under lock" by starvation.

A call that may execute arbitrary code (such as registered, or chained, callbacks) is made while holding a lock. This code may deadlock whenever the callbacks obtain locks themselves, so it is an unsafe pattern.

Example:

  SettableFuture future = null;

  public void callFutureSet() {
    future.set(null);
  }

  // synchronized means it's taking a lock implicitly
  public synchronized void example_of_bad_pattern() {
    callFutureSet(); // <- issue reported here
  }

  // If the call is made while holding multiple locks, the warning
  // will be issued only at the innermost lock acquisition. Here we
  // report in example_of_bad_pattern but we won't report below.
  public void nested_bad_pattern_no_report(Object o) {
    synchronized (o) {
      example_of_bad_pattern(); // <- no issue reported
    }
  }

BAD_ARG

Reported as "Bad Arg" by pulse.

Bad arg in Erlang: Reports an error when the type of an argument is wrong or the argument is badly formed. Corresponds to the badarg error in the Erlang runtime.

For example, trying to concatenate the number 3 with the list [1,2] gives badarg error because 3 is not a list.

f() ->
    3 ++ [1,2]. // badarg error

Note that although the first argument needs to be a list, the second argument may not be a list. For instance, concatenating [1,2] with the number 3 raises no error in Erlang.

g() ->
    [1,2] ++ 3. // no error. Result: [1,2|3]

BAD_ARG_LATENT

Reported as "Bad Arg Latent" by pulse.

A latent BAD_ARG. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

BAD_KEY

Reported as "Bad Key" by pulse.

Bad key in Erlang: Reports an error when trying to access or update a non-existing key in a map. Corresponds to the {badkey,K} error in the Erlang runtime.

For example, trying to update the key 2 in M gives {badkey,2} error because 2 is not present as a key in M.

f() ->
    M = #{},
    M#{2 := 3}.

Note that maps currently use a recency abstraction, meaning that only the most recent key/value is tracked. Therefore, if a map is non-empty and we try to access a key other than the one we track, we just assume that it is there to avoid false positives.

BAD_KEY_LATENT

Reported as "Bad Key Latent" by pulse.

A latent BAD_KEY. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

BAD_MAP

Reported as "Bad Map" by pulse.

Bad map in Erlang: Reports an error when trying to access or update a key for a term that is not a map. Corresponds to the {badmap,...} error in the Erlang runtime.

For example, trying to update L as if it was a map gives {badmap,[1,2,3]} error because L is actually a list ([1,2,3]).

f() ->
    L = [1,2,3],
    L#{1 => 2}.

BAD_MAP_LATENT

Reported as "Bad Map Latent" by pulse.

A latent BAD_MAP. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

BAD_RECORD

Reported as "Bad Record" by pulse.

Bad record in Erlang: Reports an error when trying to access or update a record with the wrong name. Corresponds to the {badrecord,Name} error in the Erlang runtime.

For example, accessing R as a person record gives {badrecord,person} error because R is rabbit (even though both share the name field).

-record(person, {name, phone}).
-record(rabbit, {name, color}).

f() ->
    R = #rabbit{name = "Bunny", color = "Brown"},
    R#person.name.

BAD_RECORD_LATENT

Reported as "Bad Record Latent" by pulse.

A latent BAD_RECORD. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

BAD_RETURN

Reported as "Bad Return" by pulse.

Bad return in Erlang: The dynamic type of a returned value disagrees with the static type given in the spec.

For example, this function returns an integer, while the spec says it returns an atom.

-spec f() -> atom().
f() -> 1.

Note that this will not lead to a runtime error when running the Erlang program.

BAD_RETURN_LATENT

Reported as "Bad Return Latent" by pulse.

A latent BAD_RETURN. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

BIABDUCTION_MEMORY_LEAK

Reported as "Memory Leak" by biabduction.

See MEMORY_LEAK.

BIABDUCTION_RETAIN_CYCLE

Reported as "Retain Cycle" by biabduction.

See RETAIN_CYCLE.

BLOCK_PARAMETER_NOT_NULL_CHECKED

Reported as "Block Parameter Not Null Checked" by parameter-not-null-checked.

This error type is reported only in Objective-C/Objective-C++. It happens when a method has a block as a parameter, and the block is executed in the method's body without checking it for nil first. If a nil block is passed to the method, then this will cause a crash. For example:

- (void)uploadTaskWithRequest:(NSURLRequest*)urlRequest
                       fromFile:(NSURL*)fileURL
                       delegate:(id)delegate
                  delegateQueue:(NSOperationQueue*)delegateQueue
                     completion:(void (^)())completion {
     ...
    completion();
}

Action: Possible solutions are adding a check for nil, or making sure that the method is not ever called with nil. When an argument will never be nil, you can add the annotation nonnull to the argument's type, to tell Infer (and the type system), that the argument won't be nil. This will silence the warning.

BUFFER_OVERRUN_L1

Reported as "Buffer Overrun L1" by bufferoverrun.

This is reported when outside of buffer bound is accessed. It can corrupt memory and may introduce security issues in C/C++.

For example, int a[3]; a[5] = 42; generates a BUFFER_OVERRUN_L1 on a[5] = 42;.

Buffer overrun reports fall into several "buckets" corresponding to the expected precision of the report. The higher the number, the more likely it is to be a false positive.

• L1: The most faithful report, when it must be unsafe. For example, array size: [3,3], offset: [5,5].

• L2: Less faithful report than L1, when it may be unsafe. For example, array size:[3,3], offset: [0,5]. Note that the offset may be a safe value in the real execution, i.e. safe when 0, 1, or 2; unsafe when 3, 4, or 5.

• L5: The least faithful report, when there is an interval top. For example, array size: [3,3], offset: [-oo,+oo].

• L4: More faithful report than L5, when there is an infinity value. For example, array size: [3,3], offset: [0, +oo].

• L3: The reports that are not included in the above cases.

• S2: An array access is unsafe by symbolic values. For example, array size: [n,n], offset [n,+oo].

• U5: An array access is unsafe by unknown values, which are usually from unknown function calls.

BUFFER_OVERRUN_L2

Reported as "Buffer Overrun L2" by bufferoverrun.

See BUFFER_OVERRUN_L1

BUFFER_OVERRUN_L3

Reported as "Buffer Overrun L3" by bufferoverrun.

See BUFFER_OVERRUN_L1

BUFFER_OVERRUN_L4

Reported as "Buffer Overrun L4" by bufferoverrun.

See BUFFER_OVERRUN_L1

BUFFER_OVERRUN_L5

Reported as "Buffer Overrun L5" by bufferoverrun.

See BUFFER_OVERRUN_L1

BUFFER_OVERRUN_S2

Reported as "Buffer Overrun S2" by bufferoverrun.

See BUFFER_OVERRUN_L1

BUFFER_OVERRUN_U5

Reported as "Buffer Overrun U5" by bufferoverrun.

See BUFFER_OVERRUN_L1

CAPTURED_STRONG_SELF

Reported as "Captured strongSelf" by self-in-block.

This check is about when a strong pointer to self is captured in a block. This could lead to retain cycles or unexpected behavior since to avoid retain cycles one usually uses a local strong pointer or a captured weak pointer instead.

This will happen in one of two cases generally:

1. One uses weakSelf but forgot to declare it weak first.

Example:

  __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;
  int (^my_block)(BOOL) = ^(BOOL isTapped) {
    __strong __typeof(weakSelf) strongSelf = weakSelf;
    return strongSelf->x;
  };

Action: Replace the first line with __weak __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;.

2. One is using strongSelf, declared in a block, in another inner block. The retain cycle is avoided in the outer block because strongSelf is a local variable of the block. If strongSelf is used in the inner block, then it's not a local variable anymore, but a captured variable.

   Example:

  __weak __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;
  int (^my_block)() = ^() {
    __strong typeof(self) strongSelf = weakSelf;
    if (strongSelf) {
      int (^my_block)() = ^() {
        int x = strongSelf->x;
        ...
      };
      ...
    }
    ...
  };

In this example, strongSelf is a captured variable of the inner block, and this could cause retain cycles.

Action: Use a new pointer to self local to the inner block. In the example:

  __weak __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;
  int (^my_block)() = ^() {
    __strong typeof(self) strongSelf = weakSelf;
    if (strongSelf) {
      int (^my_block)() = ^() {
         __typeof(self) innerStrongSelf = weakSelf;
        int x = innerStrongSelf->x;
        ...
      };
      ...
    }
    ...
  };

Or, to improve readability, move the inner block logic into a separate method.

Another solution could be to copy the instance variable that one needs to access inside the inner block to a local variable, and use the local variable instead:

  __weak __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;
  int (^my_block)() = ^() {
    __strong typeof(self) strongSelf = weakSelf;
    if (strongSelf) {
      int my_x = strongSelf->x;
      int (^my_block)() = ^() {
        int x = my_x;
        ...
      };
      ...
    }
    ...
  };

CHECKERS_ALLOCATES_MEMORY

Reported as "Allocates Memory" by annotation-reachability.

A method annotated with @NoAllocation transitively calls new.

Example:

class C implements I {
  @NoAllocation
  void directlyAllocatingMethod() {
    new Object();
  }
}

CHECKERS_ANNOTATION_REACHABILITY_ERROR

Reported as "Annotation Reachability Error" by annotation-reachability.

A method annotated with an annotation @A transitively calls a method annotated @B where the combination of annotations is forbidden (for example, @UiThread calling @WorkerThread).

CHECKERS_CALLS_EXPENSIVE_METHOD

Reported as "Expensive Method Called" by annotation-reachability.

A method annotated with @PerformanceCritical transitively calls a method annotated @Expensive.

Example:

class C {
  @PerformanceCritical
  void perfCritical() {
    expensive();
  }

  @Expensive
  void expensive() {}
}

CHECKERS_EXPENSIVE_OVERRIDES_UNANNOTATED

Reported as "Expensive Overrides Unannotated" by annotation-reachability.

A method annotated with @Expensive overrides an un-annotated method.

Example:

interface I {
  void foo();
}

class A implements I {
  @Expensive
  public void foo() {}
}

CHECKERS_FRAGMENT_RETAINS_VIEW

Reported as "Fragment Retains View" by fragment-retains-view.

This error type is Android-specific. It fires when a Fragment type fails to nullify one or more of its declared View fields in onDestroyView. In performance-sensitive applications, a Fragment should initialize all View's in onCreateView and nullify them in onDestroyView. If a Fragment is placed on the back stack and fails to nullify a View in onDestroyView, it will retain a useless reference to that View that will not be cleaned up until the Fragment is resumed or destroyed.

Action: Nullify the View in question in onDestroyView.

CHECKERS_PRINTF_ARGS

Reported as "Printf Args" by printf-args.

This error is reported when the argument types to a printf method do not match the format string.

  void stringInsteadOfInteger(PrintStream out) {
    out.printf("Hello %d", "world");
  }

Action: fix the mismatch between format string and argument types.

CONFIG_IMPACT

Reported as "Config Impact" by config-impact-analysis.

Infer reports this issue when an expensive function is called without a config check. The config is usually a boolean value that enables experimental new features and it is defined per application/codebase, e.g. gatekeepers. To determine whether a function is expensive or not, the checker relies on modeled functions that are assumed to be expensive, e.g. string operations, regular expression match, or DB accesses.

Similar to Cost analysis, this issue type is reported only in differential mode, i.e. when there are original code and modified one and we can compare Infer's results on both of them.

For instance, if we have the following code

// version1
foo();
if (config_check){
   bar();
}

which is then modified to next

// version2
foo();
if (config_check){
   bar();
}
goo(); // added

the analysis would warn the developer that "goo() is a newly added function call and it might cause an unexpected new behavior". However, if we were to add goo() right after bar(), then Infer wouldn't warn about it because it is already gated under the config_check.

The analysis is inter-procedural: it can reason about impacts by code changes not only inside a single procedure, but also the impacts that are propagated by function calls. Thus, if we were to modify version1 to version3 below by calling goo() in foo(),

// version3
void foo(){
   // ....
   goo(); // added
}

then the analysis will report a CONFIG_IMPACT issue on the ungated call site of foo().

Currently, the analysis supports both Objective-C and Java but not C++.

Action: Make sure the ungated code change is semantically correct and harmless in terms of execution cost. If you are not sure, gate it with a new or pre-existing config.

CONFIG_IMPACT_STRICT

Reported as "Config Impact Strict" by config-impact-analysis.

This is similar to CONFIG_IMPACT issue but the analysis reports all ungated codes irrespective of whether they are expensive or not.

CONFIG_USAGE

Reported as "Config Usage" by pulse.

Infer reports this issue when a config value is used as branch condition in a function. The config is usually a boolean value that enables experimental new features and it is defined per application/codebase, e.g. gatekeepers.

For instance, if we have the following code

void foo() {
  if(config_check("my_new_feature")){ ... }
}

then analysis would provide information that "the function foo uses the config my_new_feature as branch condition".

Note: This type of issue is only for providing semantic information, rather than warning or reporting actual problem.

CONSTANT_ADDRESS_DEREFERENCE

Reported as "Constant Address Dereference" by pulse.

This is reported when an address at an absolute location, e.g. 1234, is dereferenced. It is a more general version of the NULLPTR_DEREFERENCE error type that is reported when the address is a constant other than zero.

For example, int *p = (int *) 123; *p = 42; generates a CONSTANT_ADDRESS_DEREFERENCE on *p = 42;.

For more information see the NULLPTR_DEREFERENCE issue type.

CONSTANT_ADDRESS_DEREFERENCE_LATENT

Reported as "Constant Address Dereference Latent" by pulse.

A latent CONSTANT_ADDRESS_DEREFERENCE. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

CREATE_INTENT_FROM_URI

Reported as "Create Intent From Uri" by quandary.

Create an intent/start a component using a (possibly user-controlled) URI. may or may not be an issue depending on where the URI comes from.

CROSS_SITE_SCRIPTING

Reported as "Cross Site Scripting" by quandary.

Untrusted data flows into HTML; XSS risk.

CXX_REF_CAPTURED_IN_BLOCK

Reported as "C++ Reference Captured in Block" by self-in-block.

This check flags when a C++ reference is captured in an escaping block. This means that the block will be leaving the current scope, i.e. it is not annotated with __attribute__((noescape)).

Example:

- (void)ref_captured_in_escaping_block_bad:(int&)y {
  dispatch_async(dispatch_get_main_queue(), ^{
    int a = y;
    ...
  });
  ...;
}

This could cause crashes because C++ references are not managed pointers (like ARC pointers) and so the referent is likely to be gone if the block dereferences it later.

DANGLING_POINTER_DEREFERENCE

Reported as "Dangling Pointer Dereference" by biabduction.

DATALOG_FACT

Reported as "Datalog Fact" by datalog.

Datalog fact used as input for a datalog solver.

DATA_FLOW_TO_SINK

Reported as "Data Flow to Sink" by pulse.

A flow of data was detected to a sink.

DEADLOCK

Reported as "Deadlock" by starvation.

This error is currently reported in Java. A deadlock occurs when two distinct threads try to acquire two locks in reverse orders. The following code illustrates a textbook example. Of course, in real deadlocks, the lock acquisitions may be separated by deeply nested call chains.

  public void lockAThenB() {
    synchronized(lockA) {
      synchronized(lockB) {
       // do something with both resources
      }
    }
  }

  public void lockBThenA() {
    synchronized(lockB) {
      synchronized(lockA) {
       // do something with both resources
      }
    }
  }

The standard solution to a deadlock is to fix an order of lock acquisition and adhere to that order in all cases. Another solution may be to shrink the critical sections (i.e., the code executing under lock) to the minimum required.

Old-style containers such as Vector are synchronized on the object monitor, which means that deadlocks can occur even without explicit synchronisation on both threads. For instance:

  public void lockAThenAddToVector() {
    synchronized(lockA) {
      vector.add(object);
    }
  }

  public void lockVectorThenA() {
    synchronized(vector) {
      synchronized(lockA) {
       // do something with both resources
      }
    }
  }

Infer has support for detecting these deadlocks too.

To suppress reports of deadlocks in a method m() use the @SuppressLint("DEADLOCK") annotation, as follows:

  import android.annotation.SuppressLint;

  @SuppressLint("DEADLOCK")
  public void m() {
  ...
  }

DEAD_STORE

Reported as "Dead Store" by liveness.

This error is reported in C++. It fires when the value assigned to a variables is never used (e.g., int i = 1; i = 2; return i;).

DIVIDE_BY_ZERO

Reported as "Divide By Zero" by biabduction.

EMPTY_VECTOR_ACCESS

Reported as "Empty Vector Access" by biabduction.

This error type is reported only in C++, in versions >= C++11.

The code is trying to access an element of a vector that Infer believes to be empty. Such an access will cause undefined behavior at runtime.

#include <vector>
int foo(){
  const std::vector<int> vec;
  return vec[0]; // Empty vector access reported here
}

EXECUTION_TIME_COMPLEXITY_INCREASE

Reported as "Execution Time Complexity Increase" by cost.

Infer reports this issue when the execution time complexity of a program increases in degree: e.g. from constant to linear or from logarithmic to quadratic. This issue type is only reported in differential mode: i.e when we are comparing the cost analysis results of two runs of infer on a file. Check out examples in here.

EXECUTION_TIME_COMPLEXITY_INCREASE_UI_THREAD

Reported as "Execution Time Complexity Increase Ui Thread" by cost.

Infer reports this issue when the execution time complexity of the procedure increases in degree and the procedure runs on the UI (main) thread.

Infer considers a method as running on the UI thread whenever:

• The method, one of its overrides, its class, or an ancestral class, is annotated with @UiThread.
• The method, or one of its overrides is annotated with @OnEvent, @OnClick, etc.
• The method or its callees call a Litho.ThreadUtils method such as assertMainThread.

EXECUTION_TIME_UNREACHABLE_AT_EXIT

Reported as "Execution Time Unreachable At Exit" by cost.

This issue type indicates that the program's execution doesn't reach the exit node (where our analysis computes the final cost of the procedure). Hence, we cannot compute a static bound for the procedure.

Examples:

void exit_unreachable() {
  exit(0); // modeled as unreachable
}

void infeasible_path_unreachable() {
    Preconditions.checkState(false); // like assert false, state pruned to bottom
}

EXPENSIVE_EXECUTION_TIME

Reported as "Expensive Execution Time" by cost.

[EXPERIMENTAL] This warning indicates that the procedure has non-constant and non-top execution cost. By default, this issue type is disabled. To enable it, set enabled=true in costKind.ml.

For instance, a simple example where we report this issue is a function with linear cost:

int sum_linear(ArrayList<Integer> list){
 int sum = 0;
 for (Integer el: list){
   sum += el;
 }
 return sum;
}

EXPENSIVE_LOOP_INVARIANT_CALL

Reported as "Expensive Loop Invariant Call" by loop-hoisting.

We report this issue type when a function is loop-invariant and also expensive (i.e. at least has linear complexity as determined by the cost analysis).

int incr(int x) {
  return x + 1;
}

// incr will not be hoisted since it is cheap(constant time)
void foo_linear(int size) {
  int x = 10;
  for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) {
    incr(x); // constant call, don't hoist
  }
}

// call to foo_linear will be hoisted since it is expensive(linear in size).
void symbolic_expensive_hoist(int size) {
  for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) {
    foo_linear(size); // hoist
  }
}

EXPOSED_INSECURE_INTENT_HANDLING

Reported as "Exposed Insecure Intent Handling" by quandary.

Undocumented.

GUARDEDBY_VIOLATION

Reported as "GuardedBy Violation" by racerd.

A field annotated with @GuardedBy is being accessed by a call-chain that starts at a non-private method without synchronization.

Example:

class C {
  @GuardedBy("this")
  String f;

  void foo(String s) {
    f = s; // unprotected access here
  }
}

Action: Protect the offending access by acquiring the lock indicated by the @GuardedBy(...).

IMPURE_FUNCTION

Reported as "Impure Function" by impurity.

This issue type indicates impure functions. For instance, below functions would be marked as impure:

void makeAllZero_impure(ArrayList<Foo> list) {
  Iterator<Foo> listIterator = list.iterator();
  while (listIterator.hasNext()) {
    Foo foo = listIterator.next();
    foo.x = 0;
  }
}

INEFFICIENT_KEYSET_ITERATOR

Reported as "Inefficient Keyset Iterator" by inefficient-keyset-iterator.

This issue is raised when

• iterating over a HashMap with ketSet() iterator
• looking up the key each time

Example:

void inefficient_loop_bad(HashMap<String, Integer> testMap) {
 for (String key : testMap.keySet()) {
   Integer value = testMap.get(key); // extra look-up cost
   foo(key, value);
 }
}

Action:

Instead, it is more efficient to iterate over the loop with entrySet which returns key-vaue pairs and gets rid of the hashMap lookup.

void efficient_loop_ok(HashMap<String, Integer> testMap) {
  for (Map.Entry<String, Integer> entry : testMap.entrySet()) {
    String key = entry.getKey();
    Integer value = entry.getValue();
    foo(key, value);
  }
}

INFERBO_ALLOC_IS_BIG

Reported as "Alloc Is Big" by bufferoverrun.

malloc is passed a large constant value (>=10^6). For example, int n = 1000000; malloc(n); generates INFERBO_ALLOC_IS_BIG on malloc(n).

Action: Fix the size argument or make sure it is really needed.

INFERBO_ALLOC_IS_NEGATIVE

Reported as "Alloc Is Negative" by bufferoverrun.

malloc is called with a negative size. For example, int n = 3 - 5; malloc(n); generates INFERBO_ALLOC_IS_NEGATIVE on malloc(n).

Action: Fix the size argument.

INFERBO_ALLOC_IS_ZERO

Reported as "Alloc Is Zero" by bufferoverrun.

malloc is called with a zero size. For example, int n = 3 - 3; malloc(n); generates INFERBO_ALLOC_IS_ZERO on malloc(n).

Action: Fix the size argument.

INFERBO_ALLOC_MAY_BE_BIG

Reported as "Alloc May Be Big" by bufferoverrun.

malloc may be called with a large value. For example, int n = b ? 3 : 1000000; malloc(n); generates INFERBO_ALLOC_MAY_BE_BIG on malloc(n).

Action: Fix the size argument or add a bound checking, e.g. if (n < A_SMALL_NUMBER) { malloc(n); }.

INFERBO_ALLOC_MAY_BE_NEGATIVE

Reported as "Alloc May Be Negative" by bufferoverrun.

malloc may be called with a negative value. For example, int n = b ? 3 : -5; malloc(n); generates INFERBO_ALLOC_MAY_BE_NEGATIVE on malloc(n).

Action: Fix the size argument or add a bound checking, e.g. if (n > 0) { malloc(n); }.

INFINITE_EXECUTION_TIME

Reported as "Infinite Execution Time" by cost.

This warning indicates that Infer was not able to determine a static upper bound on the execution cost of the procedure. By default, this issue type is disabled.

Example 1: T due to expressivity

For instance, Inferbo's interval analysis is limited to affine expressions. Hence, we can't statically estimate an upper bound on the below example and obtain T(unknown) cost:

// Expected: square root(x), got T
void square_root_FP(int x) {
 int i = 0;
 while (i * i < x) {
   i++;
 }
}

Example 2: T due to unmodeled calls

Another common case where we get T cost is when Infer cannot statically determine the range of values for loop bounds. For instance,

void loop_over_charArray_FP(StringBuilder builder, String input) {
  for (Character c : input.toCharArray()) {}
}

Here, Infer does not have any InferBo models for the range of values returned by String.toCharArray, hence it cannot determine that we will be iterating over a char array in the size of input string.

To teach InferBo about such library calls, they should be semantically modeled in InferBo.

Example 3: T due to calling another T-costed function

Since the analysis is inter-procedural, another example we can have T cost is if at least one of the callees has T cost.

// Expected: constant, got T
void call_top_cost_FP() {
 square_root_FP(1); // square_root_FP has Top cost
}

INSECURE_INTENT_HANDLING

Reported as "Insecure Intent Handling" by quandary.

Undocumented.

INTEGER_OVERFLOW_L1

Reported as "Integer Overflow L1" by bufferoverrun.

This is reported when integer overflow occurred by integer operations such as addition, subtraction, and multiplication. For example, int n = INT_MAX; int m = n + 3; generates a INTEGER_OVERFLOW_L1 on n + 3.

Integer overflows reports fall into several "buckets" corresponding to the expected precision of the report. The higher the number, the more likely it is to be a false positive.

• L1: The most faithful report, when it must be unsafe. For example, [2147483647,2147483647] + [1,1] in 32-bit signed integer type.

• L2: Less faithful report than L1, when it may be unsafe. For example, [2147483647,2147483647] + [0,1] in 32-bit signed integer type. Note that the integer of RHS can be 0, which is safe.

• L5: The reports that are not included in the above cases.

• U5: A binary integer operation is unsafe by unknown values, which are usually from unknown function calls.

INTEGER_OVERFLOW_L2

Reported as "Integer Overflow L2" by bufferoverrun.

See INTEGER_OVERFLOW_L1

INTEGER_OVERFLOW_L5

Reported as "Integer Overflow L5" by bufferoverrun.

See INTEGER_OVERFLOW_L1

INTEGER_OVERFLOW_U5

Reported as "Integer Overflow U5" by bufferoverrun.

See INTEGER_OVERFLOW_L1

INTERFACE_NOT_THREAD_SAFE

Reported as "Interface Not Thread Safe" by racerd.

This error indicates that you have invoked an interface method not annotated with @ThreadSafe from a thread-safe context (e.g., code that uses locks or is marked @ThreadSafe). The fix is to add the @ThreadSafe annotation to the interface or to the interface method. For background on why these annotations are needed, see the detailed explanation here.

INVALID_SIL

Reported as "Invalid Sil" by sil-validation.

The SIL instruction does not conform to the expected subset of instructions expected for the front-end of the language for the analyzed code.

INVARIANT_CALL

Reported as "Invariant Call" by loop-hoisting.

We report this issue type when a function call is loop-invariant and hoistable, i.e.

• the function has no side side effects (pure)
• has invariant arguments and result (i.e. have the same value in all loop iterations)
• it is guaranteed to execute, i.e. it dominates all loop sources

int foo(int x, int y) {
 return x + y;
}


void invariant_hoist(int size) {
    int x = 10;
    int y = 5;
    for (int i = 0; i < size; i++) {
      foo(x, y); // hoistable
    }
  }

IPC_ON_UI_THREAD

Reported as "Ipc On Ui Thread" by starvation.

A blocking Binder IPC call occurs on the UI thread.

JAVASCRIPT_INJECTION

Reported as "Javascript Injection" by quandary.

Untrusted data flows into JavaScript.

LAB_RESOURCE_LEAK

Reported as "Lab Resource Leak" by resource-leak-lab.

Toy issue.

LOCKLESS_VIOLATION

Reported as "Lockless Violation" by starvation.

A method implements an interface signature annotated with @Lockless but which transitively acquires a lock.

Example:

Interface I {
    @Lockless
    public void no_lock();
}

class C implements I {
  private synchronized do_lock() {}

  public void no_lock() { // this method should not acquire any locks
    do_lock();
  }
}

LOCK_CONSISTENCY_VIOLATION

Reported as "Lock Consistency Violation" by racerd.

This is an error reported on C++ and Objective C classes whenever:

• Some class method directly uses locking primitives (not transitively).
• It has a public method which writes to some member x while holding a lock.
• It has a public method which reads x without holding a lock.

The above may happen through a chain of calls. Above, x may also be a container (an array, a vector, etc).

Fixing Lock Consistency Violation reports

• Avoid the offending access (most often the read). Of course, this may not be possible.
• Use synchronization to protect the read, by using the same lock protecting the corresponding write.
• Make the method doing the read access private. This should silence the warning, since Infer looks for a pair of non-private methods. Objective-C: Infer considers a method as private if it's not exported in the header-file interface.

LOGGING_PRIVATE_DATA

Reported as "Logging Private Data" by quandary.

Undocumented.

MEMORY_LEAK_C

Reported as "Memory Leak" by pulse.

Memory leak in C

This error type is only reported in C and Objective-C code. In Java we do not report memory leaks because it is a garbage collected language.

In C, Infer reports memory leaks when objects are created with malloc and not freed. For example:

-(void) memory_leak_bug {
    struct Person *p = malloc(sizeof(struct Person));
}

Memory leak in Objective-C

Additionally, in Objective-C, Infer reports memory leaks that happen when objects from Core Foundation or Core Graphics don't get released.

-(void) memory_leak_bug_cf {
    CGPathRef shadowPath = CGPathCreateWithRect(self.inputView.bounds, NULL); //object created and not released.
}

MEMORY_LEAK_CPP

Reported as "Memory Leak" by pulse.

See MEMORY_LEAK_C

MISSING_REQUIRED_PROP

Reported as "Missing Required Prop" by litho-required-props.

This issues is reported when a required @Prop is missing.

Examples

Assume that the following Litho Component specification is defined as follows where prop1 is optional and prop2 is required.

class MyComponentSpec {

  static void onCreate(
      ComponentContext c,
      @Prop(optional = true) String prop1, @Prop int prop2) {
    ...
  }
  ...
}

When we build the corresponding component, we should have all the required props. If we are missing optional props (e..g prop1 below), it is ok.

MyComponent.create(c)
    .prop2(8)
    .build();

However, if we are missing a required prop, Infer gives an error below for the missing prop2.

MyComponent.create(c)
    .prop1("My prop 1")
    .build();

** Action **

There are two ways to fix this issue.

First, we could add the missing prop2:

MyComponent.create(c)
    .prop1("My prop 1")
    .prop2(x) // where x is some integer
    .build();

or alternatively, if the prop2 is not really required, we could change the component spec to reflect that:

class MyComponentSpec {

  static void onCreate(
      ComponentContext c,
      @Prop(optional = true) String prop1, @Prop(optional = true) int prop2) {
    ...
  }
  ...
}

MIXED_SELF_WEAKSELF

Reported as "Mixed Self WeakSelf" by self-in-block.

This check reports an issue when an Objective-C block captures both self and weakSelf, a weak pointer to self. Possibly the developer meant to capture only weakSelf to avoid a retain cycle, but made a typo and used self instead of strongSelf. In this case, this could cause a retain cycle.

Example:

  __weak __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;
  int (^my_block)() = ^() {
    __strong __typeof(weakSelf) strongSelf = weakSelf;
    if (strongSelf) {
      [strongSelf foo];
      int x = self->x; // typo here
    }
    return 0;
  };

Action: Fixing the typo is generally the right course of action.

Limitations: To keep this check simple and intra-procedural, we rely on names to find weakSelf: we assume that any captured weak pointer whose name contains "self" is a weak reference to self.

MODIFIES_IMMUTABLE

Reported as "Modifies Immutable" by impurity.

This issue type indicates modifications to fields marked as @Immutable. For instance, below function mutateArray would be marked as modifying immutable field testArray:

  @Immutable int[] testArray = new int[]{0, 1, 2, 4};
  
  int[] getTestArray() {
    return testArray;
  }                
          
  void mutateArray() {
    int[] array = getTestArray();
    array[2] = 7;
  }

MULTIPLE_WEAKSELF

Reported as "Multiple WeakSelf Use" by self-in-block.

This check reports when an Objective-C block uses weakSelf (a weak pointer to self) more than once. This could lead to unexpected behaviour. Even if weakSelf is not nil in the first use, it could be nil in the following uses since the object that weakSelf points to could be freed anytime.

Example:

  __weak __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;
  int (^my_block)() = ^() {
      [weakSelf foo];
      int x = weakSelf->x;
  };

Action: One should assign weakSelf to a strong pointer first, and then use it in the block.

  __weak __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;
  int (^my_block)() = ^() {
    __strong __typeof(weakSelf) strongSelf = weakSelf;
    if (strongSelf) {
      [strongSelf foo];
      int x = strongSelf->x;
    }
    ...
  };

Limitations: To keep this check simple and intra-procedural, we rely on names to find weakSelf: we assume that any captured weak pointer whose name contains "self" is a weak reference to self. In contrast, strongSelf is a local variable to the block, so the check supports any name given to a local strong pointer that has been assigned weakSelf.

NIL_BLOCK_CALL

Reported as "Nil Block Call" by pulse.

This check reports when one tries to call an Objective-C block that is nil. This causes a crash.

Example:

-(void) foo:(void (^)())callback {
    callback();
}

-(void) bar {
    [self foo:nil]; //crash
}

Action:

Adding a check for nil before calling the block, or making sure never to call the method foo: with nil.

NIL_BLOCK_CALL_LATENT

Reported as "Nil Block Call Latent" by pulse.

A latent NIL_BLOCK_CALL. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NIL_INSERTION_INTO_COLLECTION

Reported as "Nil Insertion Into Collection" by pulse.

This checks reports when nil is passed to collections in Objective-C such as arrays and dictionaries. This causes a crash.

Arrays

Adding objects to an array, inserting objects at a given index, or replacing objects at a given index, can all lead to a crash when the object is nil.

  [mArray addObject:nil];  //crash

  [mArray insertObject:nil atIndex:0];   //crash

  [mArray replaceObjectAtIndex:0 withObject:nil]; //crash

Dictionaries

Adding a nil value in a dictionary causes a crash. If the concept of nil is required, one can add [NSNull null] instead.

  id value = nil;
  [mDict setObject:value forKey:@"somestring"]; //crash

  [mDict setObject:[NSNull null] forKey:@"somestring"]; //ok

Retrieving or removing an object from a dictionary with a nil key also causes a crash:

    id key = nil;
    mDict[key] = @"somestring"; //crash

   [mDict removeObjectForKey:nil]; //crash

Action:

In all the cases above, when passing nil causes a crash, the solutions are either making sure that the object passed will never be nil, or adding a check for nil before calling those methods.

NIL_INSERTION_INTO_COLLECTION_LATENT

Reported as "Nil Insertion Into Collection" by pulse.

A latent NIL_INSERTION_INTO_COLLECTION. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NIL_MESSAGING_TO_NON_POD

Reported as "Nil Messaging To Non Pod" by pulse.

In Objective-C, calling a method on nil (or in Objective-C terms, sending a message to nil) does not crash, it simply returns a falsy value (nil/0/false). However, sending a message that returns a non-POD C++ type (POD being "Plain Old Data", essentially anything that cannot be compiled as a C-style struct) to nil causes undefined behaviour.

std::shared_ptr<int> callMethodReturnsnonPOD() {
  SomeObject* obj = getObjectOrNil();
  std::shared_ptr<int> d = [obj returnsnonPOD]; // UB
  return d;
}

To fix the above issue, we need to check if obj is not nil before calling the returnsnonPOD method:

std::shared_ptr<int> callMethodReturnsnonPOD(bool b) {
  SomeObject* obj = getObjectOrNil(b);
  if (obj == nil) { return std::make_shared<int>(0); }
  std::shared_ptr<int> d = [obj returnsnonPOD];
  return d;
}

NIL_MESSAGING_TO_NON_POD_LATENT

Reported as "Nil Messaging To Non Pod Latent" by pulse.

A latent NIL_MESSAGING_TO_NON_POD. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NO_MATCHING_BRANCH_IN_TRY

Reported as "No Matching Branch In Try" by pulse.

No matching branch is found when evaluating the of section of a try expression. Corresponds to the {try_clause,V} error in the Erlang runtime.

For example, if we call tail([]) and the full definition of tail is

tail(X) ->
    try X of
        [_|T] -> {ok,T}
    catch
        _ -> error
    end.

NO_MATCHING_BRANCH_IN_TRY_LATENT

Reported as "No Matching Branch In Try Latent" by pulse.

A latent NO_MATCHING_BRANCH_IN_TRY. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NO_MATCHING_CASE_CLAUSE

Reported as "No Matching Case Clause" by pulse.

No matching case clause in Erlang: Reports an error when none of the clauses of a case match the expression. Corresponds to the {case_clause,V} error in the Erlang runtime.

For example, if we call tail([]) and the full definition of tail is

tail(X) ->
    case X of
        [_|T] -> T
    end.

This error is reported if either the pattern(s) or the guard(s) prevent matching any of the clauses.

NO_MATCHING_CASE_CLAUSE_LATENT

Reported as "No Matching Case Clause Latent" by pulse.

A latent NO_MATCHING_CASE_CLAUSE. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NO_MATCHING_FUNCTION_CLAUSE

Reported as "No Matching Function Clause" by pulse.

No matching function clause in Erlang: Reports an error when none of the clauses of a function match the arguments of a call. Corresponds to the function_clause error in the Erlang runtime.

For example, if we call tail([]) and the full definition of tail is

tail([_|Xs]) -> Xs.

This error is reported if either the pattern(s) or the guard(s) prevent matching any of the clauses.

NO_MATCHING_FUNCTION_CLAUSE_LATENT

Reported as "No Matching Function Clause Latent" by pulse.

A latent NO_MATCHING_FUNCTION_CLAUSE. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NO_MATCH_OF_RHS

Reported as "No Match Of Rhs" by pulse.

No match of right hand side value in Erlang: Reports an error when the right hand side value of a match expression does not match the pattern on the left hand side. Corresponds to the {badmatch,V} error in the Erlang runtime.

For example, [H|T] = [] gives the error because the left hand side pattern requires at least one element in the list on the right hand side.

NO_MATCH_OF_RHS_LATENT

Reported as "No Match Of Rhs Latent" by pulse.

A latent NO_MATCH_OF_RHS. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NO_TRUE_BRANCH_IN_IF

Reported as "No True Branch In If" by pulse.

No true branch when evaluating an if expression in Erlang: Reports an error when none of the branches of an if expression evaluate to true. Corresponds to the if_clause error in the Erlang runtime.

For example, if we call sign(0) and the full definition of sign is

sign(X) ->
    if
        X > 0 -> positive;
        X < 0 -> negative
    end.

NO_TRUE_BRANCH_IN_IF_LATENT

Reported as "No True Branch In If Latent" by pulse.

A latent NO_TRUE_BRANCH_IN_IF. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NULLPTR_DEREFERENCE

Reported as "Null Dereference" by pulse.

Infer reports null dereference bugs in Java, C, C++, and Objective-C when it is possible that the null pointer is dereferenced, leading to a crash.

Null dereference in Java

Many of Infer's reports of potential Null Pointer Exceptions (NPE) come from code of the form

  p = foo(); // foo() might return null
  stuff();
  p.goo();   // dereferencing p, potential NPE

If you see code of this form, then you have several options.

If you are unsure whether or not foo() will return null, you should ideally either

1. Change the code to ensure that foo() can not return null, or

2. Add a check that p is not null before dereferencing p.

Sometimes, in case (2) it is not obvious what you should do when p is null. One possibility is to throw an exception, failing early but explicitly. This can be done using checkNotNull as in the following code:

// code idiom for failing early
import static com.google.common.base.Preconditions.checkNotNull;

  //... intervening code

  p = checkNotNull(foo()); // foo() might return null
  stuff();
  p.goo(); // p cannot be null here

The call checkNotNull(foo()) will never return null: if foo() returns null then it fails early by throwing a Null Pointer Exception.

Facebook NOTE: If you are absolutely sure that foo() will not be null, then if you land your diff this case will no longer be reported after your diff makes it to trunk.

Null dereference in C

Here is an example of an inter-procedural null dereference bug in C:

struct Person {
  int age;
  int height;
  int weight;
};
int get_age(struct Person *who) {
  return who->age;
}
int null_pointer_interproc() {
  struct Person *joe = 0;
  return get_age(joe);
}

Null dereference in Objective-C

In Objective-C, null dereferences are less common than in Java, but they still happen and their cause can be hidden. In general, passing a message to nil does not cause a crash and returns nil, but dereferencing a pointer directly does cause a crash.

Example:

(int) foo:(C*) param {  // passing nil
  D* d = [param bar];   // nil message passing
  return d->fld;        // crash
}
(void) callFoo {
  C* c = [self bar];    // returns nil
  [foo:c];              // crash reported here
}

Action: Adding a nil check either for param above or for d, or making sure that foo: will never be called with nil.

Calling a nil block will also cause a crash. We have a dedicated issue type for this case: Nil Block Call.

Moreover, inserting nil into a collection will cause a crash as well. We also have a dedicated issue type for this case: Nil Insertion Into Collection.

NULLPTR_DEREFERENCE_IN_NULLSAFE_CLASS

Reported as "Null Dereference" by pulse.

Infer reports null dereference bugs in Java, C, C++, and Objective-C when it is possible that the null pointer is dereferenced, leading to a crash.

Null dereference in Java

Many of Infer's reports of potential Null Pointer Exceptions (NPE) come from code of the form

  p = foo(); // foo() might return null
  stuff();
  p.goo();   // dereferencing p, potential NPE

If you see code of this form, then you have several options.

If you are unsure whether or not foo() will return null, you should ideally either

1. Change the code to ensure that foo() can not return null, or

2. Add a check that p is not null before dereferencing p.

Sometimes, in case (2) it is not obvious what you should do when p is null. One possibility is to throw an exception, failing early but explicitly. This can be done using checkNotNull as in the following code:

// code idiom for failing early
import static com.google.common.base.Preconditions.checkNotNull;

  //... intervening code

  p = checkNotNull(foo()); // foo() might return null
  stuff();
  p.goo(); // p cannot be null here

The call checkNotNull(foo()) will never return null: if foo() returns null then it fails early by throwing a Null Pointer Exception.

Facebook NOTE: If you are absolutely sure that foo() will not be null, then if you land your diff this case will no longer be reported after your diff makes it to trunk.

Null dereference in C

Here is an example of an inter-procedural null dereference bug in C:

struct Person {
  int age;
  int height;
  int weight;
};
int get_age(struct Person *who) {
  return who->age;
}
int null_pointer_interproc() {
  struct Person *joe = 0;
  return get_age(joe);
}

Null dereference in Objective-C

In Objective-C, null dereferences are less common than in Java, but they still happen and their cause can be hidden. In general, passing a message to nil does not cause a crash and returns nil, but dereferencing a pointer directly does cause a crash.

Example:

(int) foo:(C*) param {  // passing nil
  D* d = [param bar];   // nil message passing
  return d->fld;        // crash
}
(void) callFoo {
  C* c = [self bar];    // returns nil
  [foo:c];              // crash reported here
}

Action: Adding a nil check either for param above or for d, or making sure that foo: will never be called with nil.

Calling a nil block will also cause a crash. We have a dedicated issue type for this case: Nil Block Call.

Moreover, inserting nil into a collection will cause a crash as well. We also have a dedicated issue type for this case: Nil Insertion Into Collection.

NULLPTR_DEREFERENCE_IN_NULLSAFE_CLASS_LATENT

Reported as "Null Dereference" by pulse.

A latent NULLPTR_DEREFERENCE_IN_NULLSAFE_CLASS. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NULLPTR_DEREFERENCE_LATENT

Reported as "Null Dereference" by pulse.

A latent NULLPTR_DEREFERENCE. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NULL_ARGUMENT

Reported as "Null Argument" by pulse.

This issue type indicates `nil` being passed as argument where a non-nil value expected.

#import <Foundation/Foundation.h>

// Test (non-nil) returned values of NSString methods against `nil`
NSString* stringNotNil(NSString* str) {
  if (!str) {
        // ERROR: NSString:stringWithString: expects a non-nil value
	return [NSString stringWithString:nil];
  }
  return str;
}

NULL_ARGUMENT_LATENT

Reported as "Null Argument Latent" by pulse.

A latent NULL_ARGUMENT. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

NULL_DEREFERENCE

Reported as "Null Dereference" by biabduction.

See NULLPTR_DEREFERENCE.

OPTIONAL_EMPTY_ACCESS

Reported as "Optional Empty Access" by pulse.

Optional Empty Access warnings are reported when we try to retrieve the value of a folly::Optional when it is empty (i.e. folly::none).

In the following example we get a warning as int_opt might be folly::none and its value is being accessed:

bool somef(int v);

folly::Optional<int> mightReturnNone(int v) {
   if (somef(v)) {
      return folly::Optional(v);
   }

   return folly::none;
}

int value_no_check() {
  folly::Optional<int> int_opt = mightReturnNone (4);
  return int_opt.value(); // Optional Empty Access warning
}

We do not get the warning anymore if we add a check whether int_opt is not empty:

int value_check() {
  folly::Optional<int> int_opt = mightReturnNone (4);
  if (int_opt.has_value()) {
     return int_opt.value(); // OK
  }
  return -1;
}

In some cases we know that we have a non-empty value and there is no need to have a check. Consider the following example where Infer does not warn:

bool somef(int v) {return v > 3;};

folly::Optional<int> mightReturnNone(int v) {
   if (somef(v)) {
      return folly::Optional(v);
   }

   return folly::none;
}

int value_no_check() {
  folly::Optional<int> int_opt = mightReturnNone (4); // cannot be folly::none
  return int_opt.value(); // OK
}

OPTIONAL_EMPTY_ACCESS_LATENT

Reported as "Optional Empty Access Latent" by pulse.

A latent OPTIONAL_EMPTY_ACCESS. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

PREMATURE_NIL_TERMINATION_ARGUMENT

Reported as "Premature Nil Termination Argument" by biabduction.

This error type is reported in C and Objective-C. In many variadic methods, nil is used to signify the end of the list of input objects. This is similar to nil-termination of C strings. If one of the arguments that is not the last argument to the method is nil as well, Infer reports an error because that may lead to unexpected behavior.

An example of such variadic methods is arrayWithObjects

  NSArray *foo = [NSArray arrayWithObjects: @"aaa", str, @"bbb", nil];

In this example, if str is nil then an array @[@"aaa"] of size 1 will be created, and not an array @[@"aaa", str, @"bbb"] of size 3 as expected.

PULSE_CONST_REFABLE

Reported as "Const Refable Parameter" by pulse.

This issue is reported when a function parameter is a) passed by value and b) is not modified inside the function. Instead, parameter can be passed by const reference, i.e. converted to a const& so that no unnecessary copy is created at the callsite of the function.

For example,

#include <vector>

int read_first(const std::vector<int>& vec) { return vec[0]; }

void const_refable(std::vector<int> vec) {
  int first = read_first(vec); // vec is never modified, so the parameter should have type const&
}

PULSE_DICT_MISSING_KEY

Reported as "Dict Missing Key" by pulse.

This issue is similar to UNINITIALIZED_VALUE issue, but it is to warn reading a missing key of dictionary in Hack.

For example, in the following code, the dictionary $d has no entry for bye, so reading $d['bye'] will throw the OutOfBoundsException exception, which is usually unexpected from developers. We can use a safer function idx instead when keys of a dictionary is unclear.

function simple_bad() : int {
  $d = dict['hi' => 42, 'hello' => 52];
  return $d['bye'];
}

PULSE_READONLY_SHARED_PTR_PARAM

Reported as "Read-only Shared Parameter" by pulse.

This issue is reported when a shared pointer parameter is a) passed by value and b) is used only for reading, rather than lifetime extension. At the callsite, this might cause a potentially expensive unnecessary copy of the shared pointer, especially when many number of threads are sharing it. To avoid this, consider 1) passing the raw pointer instead and 2) use std::shared_ptr::get at callsites.

For example,

void callee(std::shared_ptr<T> x) {
  // read_T(*x);
}

void caller() {
  callee(shared_ptr);
}

can be changed to

void callee(T* p) {
  // read_T(*p);
}

void caller() {
  callee(shared_ptr.get());
}

PULSE_REFERENCE_STABILITY

Reported as "Reference Stability" by pulse.

The family of maps folly::F14ValueMap, folly::F14VectorMap, and by extension folly::F14FastMap differs slightly from std::unordered_map as it does not provide reference stability. When the map resizes such as when reserve is called or new elements are added, all existing references become invalid and should not be used.

operator[] is an interesting case as it can easily introduce unsafe code when used twice in the same expression. Depending on what keys are present and which order the compiler sequences sub-expressions, an insert via operator[] can invalidate a reference obtained in the same expression before it's read from. Typically, those cases can be improved by using other map functions such as at, find, emplace, or insert_or_assign to increase code quality and safety.

Examples:

#include <folly/container/F14Map.h>

void use_reference_after_growth_bad(folly::F14FastMap<int, int>& map) {
  const auto& valueRef = map.at(1);
  map.emplace(13, 71);
  const auto valueCopy = valueRef;
}

void unsafe_expressions_bad(folly::F14FastMap<int, int>& map) {
  // Unsafe expressions in situations where one or both keys are not present.
  map[13] = map[71];
  const auto p = map[13] * map[71];
  const auto q = f(map[13], map[71]);
}

PULSE_RESOURCE_LEAK

Reported as "Resource Leak" by pulse.

See RESOURCE_LEAK

PULSE_TRANSITIVE_ACCESS

Reported as "Transitive Access" by pulse.

This issue tracks spurious accesses that are reachable from specific entry functions.

Spurious accesses are specified as specific load/calls.

Entry functions are specified through their enclosing class that must extend a specific class and should not extend a list of specific classes.

PULSE_UNAWAITED_AWAITABLE

Reported as "Unawaited Awaitable" by pulse.

Awaitable values created by calls to asynchronous methods should eventually be awaited along all codepaths (even if their value is unused). Hence the following is not OK

class A {
  public static async genInt() : Awaitable<int>{
    // typically do something involving IO
  }

  public static async genBad() : Awaitable<void> {
    $_unused = self::genInt(); // ERROR: should have done $_unused = await self::genInt();
    return;
  }
}

Failure to await an Awaitable can lead to non-deterministic amount of the asynchronous call actually being executed, and can also indicate a logical confusion between T and Awaitable<T> that may not be caught by the type-checker.

PULSE_UNINITIALIZED_CONST

Reported as "Uninitialized Const" by pulse.

This issue is similar to UNINITIALIZED_VALUE issue, but it is to detect the uninitialized abstract const value in Hack.

For example, in the following code, the FIELD can be read by the static method get_field.

• It is problematic invoking static::FIELD, since it may be resolved to a A::FIELD access, if called from A::get_field(). Because FIELD is abstract in A, it is never assigned a value and the vm will crash. Unfortunately, Hack's type system cannot catch this.
• In the B class, FIELD is initialized, thus invoking B::get_field is safe.

abstract class A {
  abstract const string FIELD;
  
  public static function get_field(): string {
    return static::FIELD;
  }
}

function call_get_field_bad(): string {
  return A::get_field();
}

class B extends A {
  const string FIELD = "defined";
}

function call_get_field_ok(): string {
  return B::get_field();
}

PULSE_UNINITIALIZED_VALUE

Reported as "Uninitialized Value" by pulse.

The code uses a variable that has not been initialized, leading to unpredictable or unintended results.

Using uninitialized values can lead to undefined behaviors possibly resulting in crashes, security failures and invalid results.

This can easily be fixed by assigning all variables to an initial value when declaring them.

This, for example, in C:

struct coordinates {
  int x;
  int y;
};

void foo() {
  struct coordinates c;
  c.x = 42;
  c.y++; // uninitialized value c.y!

  int z;
  if (z == 0) { // uninitialized value z!
    // something
  }
}

PULSE_UNINITIALIZED_VALUE_LATENT

Reported as "Uninitialized Value" by pulse.

A latent PULSE_UNINITIALIZED_VALUE. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY

Reported as "Unnecessary Copy" by pulse.

This is reported when Infer detects an unnecessary copy of an object via copy constructor where neither the source nor the copied variable are modified before the variable goes out of scope. Rather than the copy, a reference to the source object could be used to save memory.

For example,

struct A {
  int a;
};

int unnecessary_copy(A& x){
  auto y = x; // calls copy constructor
  return y.a; // y is not modified after copy, hence we could avoid the copy by adding & after auto as below
}

int use_reference_instead(A& x){
  auto& y = x; // copy the ref only
  return y.a;
}

PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_ASSIGNMENT

Reported as "Unnecessary Copy Assignment" by pulse.

See PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY.

PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_ASSIGNMENT_CONST

Reported as "Unnecessary Copy Assignment from Const" by pulse.

See PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY.

PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_ASSIGNMENT_MOVABLE

Reported as "Unnecessary Copy Assignment Movable" by pulse.

See PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_MOVABLE.

PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_INTERMEDIATE

Reported as "Unnecessary Copy Intermediate" by pulse.

This is reported when Infer detects an unnecessary temporary copy of an intermediate object where copy is created to be passed down to a function unnecessarily. Instead, the intermediate object should either be moved into the callee or the type of the callee's parameter should be made const &.

A prime example of this occurs when we call a function with a call-by-value parameter as follows:

void callee(ExpensiveObject obj) {
  // ....
}

void caller() {
  callee(myExpensiveObj); // a copy of myExpensiveObj is created
  // the copy is destroyed right after the call  
}

In this case, when we call callee, under the hood, a copy of the argument myExpensiveObj is created to be passed to the function call. However, the copy might be unnecessary if

• callee doesn’t modify its parameter → then we can change its type to const ExpensiveObject&, getting rid of the copy at caller
• even if callee might modify the object, if the argument myExpensiveObj is never used later on, we can get rid of the copy by moving it instead: callee(std::move(myExpensiveObj)).

The analysis is careful about suggesting moves blindly though: if the argument myExpensiveObj is of type const & ExpensiveObject then we also recommend that for move to work, const-reference needs to be removed.

PS: We check for other conditions on the argument here: e.g. it should be local to the procedure, as moving a non-local member might cause other memory correctness issues like use-after-move later on.

PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_INTERMEDIATE_CONST

Reported as "Unnecessary Copy Intermediate from Const" by pulse.

See PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY.

PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_MOVABLE

Reported as "Unnecessary Copy Movable" by pulse.

This is reported when Infer detects an unnecessary copy into a field where

• the source is an rvalue-reference
• the source is not modified before it goes out of scope or is destroyed.

Note that the copy can be modified since it has the ownership of the object.

Fix: Rather than the copying into the field, the source should be moved into it.

For example,

struct A {
  std::vector<int> vec;
};

class Test {
  A mem_a;

  void unnecessary_copy(A&& src) {
   mem_a = src;
   // fix is to move as follows
   // mem_a = std::move(src);
  }

};

PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_OPTIONAL

Reported as "Unnecessary Copy to Optional" by pulse.

This is reported when Infer detects an unnecessary copy of an object via optional value construction where the source is not modified before it goes out of scope. To avoid the copy, we can move the source object or change the callee's type.

For example,

void get_optional_value(std::optional<A> x) {}

void pass_non_optional_value(A x) {
  get_optional_value(x);
  // fix is to move as follows
  // get_optional_value(std::move(x));
}

PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_OPTIONAL_CONST

Reported as "Unnecessary Copy to Optional from Const" by pulse.

See PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_OPTIONAL.

PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY_RETURN

Reported as "Unnecessary Copy Return" by pulse.

This is similar to PULSE_UNNECESSARY_COPY, but reported when a callee returns a copied value and it is not modified in its caller. We may be able to return const-ref typed value or try std::move to avoid the copy.

For example,

class MyClass {
  T v;
 public:
  T get() {
    return v; // v is copied here, which is avoidable.
  }
};

void caller(MyClass obj) {
  T x = obj.get();
  std::cout << x; // x is not modified.
}

PURE_FUNCTION

Reported as "Pure Function" by purity.

This issue type indicates pure functions. For instance, below functions would be marked as pure:

int local_write_pure(int x, int y) {
  int k = x + y;
  k++;
  return k;
}

// no change to outside state, the local allocation is ok.
int local_alloc_pure(ArrayList<Integer> list) {
  ArrayList<Integer> list_new = new ArrayList<Integer>();
  for (Integer el : list) {
    list_new.add(el);
  }
  return list_new.size();
}

However, the following ones would not be pure:

void swap_impure(int[] array, int i, int j) {
  int tmp = array[i];
  array[i] = array[j]; // modifying the input array
  array[j] = tmp;
}

int a = 0;
void set_impure(int x, int y) {
  a = x + y; //modifying a global variable
}

QUANDARY_TAINT_ERROR

Reported as "Taint Error" by quandary.

Generic taint error when nothing else fits.

REGEX_OP_ON_UI_THREAD

Reported as "Regex Op On Ui Thread" by starvation.

A potentially costly operation on a regular expression occurs on the UI thread.

RESOURCE_LEAK

Reported as "Resource Leak" by biabduction.

Infer reports resource leaks in C, Objective-C and Java. In general, resources are entities such as files, sockets, connections, etc, that need to be closed after being used.

Resource leak in C

This is an example of a resource leak in C code:

-(void) resource_leak_bug {
    FILE *fp;
    fp=fopen("c:\\test.txt", "r"); // file opened and not closed.
}

Resource leak in Java

For the remaining of this section, we will consider examples of resource leaks in Java code.

TIP: A common source of bugs is exceptions skipping past close() statements. That is the first thing to look for if INFER reports a potential resource leak.

Basics and Standard Idiom

Some objects in Java, the resources, are supposed to be closed when you stop using them, and failure to close is a resource leak. Resources include input streams, output streams, readers, writers, sockets, http connections, cursors, and json parsers.

The standard idiom is

  // Standard idiom
  Allocate resource
  try {
    do some stuff
  } finally {
    close resource
  }

or more for example,

  //  Standard Idiom
  public static void foo () throws IOException{
    FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(new File("whatever.txt"));
    try {
      fos.write(7);
    } finally {
      fos.close();
    }
  }

and you should use the standard idiom for the most part, when you don't want to return the resource to the surrounding context.

Sometimes people just leave out close(), and that is a bug, but more typically exceptional paths are the root of the problem, as in

  // leak because of exception
  public static void foo () throws IOException {
    FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(new File("whatever.txt"));
    fos.write(7);   //DOH! What if exception?
    fos.close();
  }

where an exception in fos.write will cause execution to skip past the close() statement.

Multiple Resources Bugs

We can deal with multiple resources correctly and simply just by nesting the standard idiom.

  // Two Resources nested
  public static void foo() throws IOException {
    FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(new File("whatever.txt"));
    try {
      FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(new File("everwhat.txt"));
      try {
        fos.write(fis.read());
      } finally {
        fos.close();
      }
    } finally {
      fis.close();
    }
  }

Bugs often occur when using multiple resources in other ways because of exceptions in close() methods. For example,

  // Classic Two Resources Bug
  public static void foo() throws IOException {
    FileInputStream fis = null;
    FileOutputStream fos = null;
    try {
      fis = new FileInputStream(new File("whatever.txt"));
      fos = new FileOutputStream(new File("everwhat.txt"));
      fos.write(fis.read());
    } finally {
      if (fis!=null)  fis.close();
      if (fos!=null) fos.close();
    }
  }

Here, if there is an exception in the call to fis.close() execution will skip past fos.close(); a leak.

Another way, besides the standard idiom, to deal with this problem is to swallow exceptions.

  // Two Resources Fix 1
  public static void foo() throws IOException {
    FileInputStream fis = null;
    FileOutputStream fos = null;
    try {
      fis = new FileInputStream(new File("whatever.txt"));
      fos = new FileOutputStream(new File("everwhat.txt"));
      fos.write(fis.read());
    } finally {
      try {
        if (fis!=null) fis.close();
      } catch (Exception e) {};  // Exception swallowing
      if (fos!=null) fos.close();
    }
  }

You can also swallow the exception on the output stream. Some people prefer not to swallow output stream exceptions, and also flush before closing. http://code.google.com/p/guava-libraries/issues/detail?id=1118

Notice that the nested standard idiom does not need the checks for null, which are in there in this case to protect against the case when one of the allocations throws an exception, in which case one would get a NullPointerException.

Nested_Allocations

When a resource allocation is included as an argument to a constructor, if the constructor fails it can leave an unreachable resource that no one can close.

For example gzipOutputStream = new GZIPOutputStream(new FileOutputStream(out)); is bad in case the outer constructor, GZIPOutputStream, throws an exception. In that case, no one will have a hold of the FileOutputStream and so no one will be able to close it.

In such a case you need to move the allocation the FileOutputStream out of the nested position and name it, so you are able to close if anything goes wrong during execution of the GZIPOutputStream constructor.

Here are resources that can throw exceptions i their constructor(s).

• ObjectInputStream , ObjectOutputStream, PipedInputStream, PipedOutputStream, PipedReader, PipedWriter, JarInputStream, JarOutputStream, GZIPInputStream, GZIPOutputStream , ZipFile all throw IOException
• PrintStream throws UnsupportedEncodingException

The constructors for FileInputStream, FileOutputStream and RandomAccessFile throw FileNotFoundException, but these cases are not problematic in the sense that their arguments are not resources and so they do not cause the nested resource leak.

Allocation of JSonParser and Cursor resources

Some resources are created inside libraries instead of by "new".

Cursor is an interface, the actual resources are something like SQLiteCursor. So, every time you call a function that returns a Cursor object, there is an allocation.

For instance, in the functions from SQLiteDatabase query(…) and rawQuery(…) allocate a cursor resource. For SQLiteQueryBuilder, ContentProviderClient, ContentResolver. MediaStore and DownloadManager it is only query(…) Cursor objects cursor created by these functions need to be closed (i.e., cursor.close()).

Similarly, JsonParser is an abstract class, and create a resource in functions from the class JsonFactory createParser(byte[] data) createParser(byte[] data, int offset, int len) createParser(String content) createParser(URL url) createParser(File f) JsonParser objects js created by these functions need to be closed (jp.close()). On the other hand . JasonParsers gotten from createParser(InputStream in) and createParser(Reader r) give you JsonParsers that don’t need to be closed. This is because they receive the resource from somewhere that will maintain the responsibility to close it.

Escaping resources and exceptions

Sometimes you want to return a resource to the outside, in which case you should not close it, but you still need to be careful of exceptions in case control skips past the return leaving no one to close. Here is a simple example of a positive use of escaping resources.

  // An escaping resource, shouldn't close
  public BugReportAttachment createAttachment(File reportDirectory, String fileName)
      throws FileNotFoundException {
    File file = new File(reportDirectory, fileName);
    OutputStream stream = new FileOutputStream(file);
    return new BugReportAttachment(Uri.fromFile(file), stream);
  }

In this case it is intended that an object that wraps stream is passed to the caller of createAttachment. You should certainly not close stream here, because it is being passed to the outside.

But for escaping resources like this you still need to be careful of exceptions. For example, in

  // An escaping resource, and a leak
  public BugReportAttachment createAttachment(File reportDirectory, String fileName)
      throws FileNotFoundException {
    File file = new File(reportDirectory, fileName);
    OutputStream stream = new FileOutputStream(file);
    stream.write(7);
    return new BugReportAttachment(Uri.fromFile(file), stream);
  }

if stream.write(7) throws an exception, then no one will have a hold of stream, and no one will be able to close it; a leak.

Java 7's try-with-resources

(For use with Java 7 only)

Clearly, accounting for the ramifications of all the exceptional cases is complicated, and there is a better way in Java 7.

  // Two Resources Fix 2; via try-with-resources
  public static void foo() throws IOException {
    try (
      FileInputStream fis = new FileInputStream(new File("whatever.txt"));
      FileOutputStream fos = new FileOutputStream(new File("everwhat.txt"))
    ) {
      fos.write(fis.read());
    }
  }

All the complicated exceptional cases above are (apparently) covered by this construct, and the result is much simpler.

So, if you are trying to fix a potential leak in code with multiples resources you can go ahead and try to understand whether the potential leak is real. Or, if the code is complex and it is hard to figure out, it would be perfectly legitimate to simply convert the code over to try-with-resources if you have access to Java 7, so as to save yourself some brain-cycles. You will also end up with cleaner code.

If try-with-resources is so great you should always use it. But you shouldn't… Try-with-resources gives resources static scoping, and works via a stack discipline. Sometimes, you want a resource to persist beyond scope, as in the escaping example above. In an escaping example maybe you could refactor lots of code so that try-with-resources applies, and maybe you cannot in a sensible way. This just illustrates that, though you might hear people say that try-with-resources "solves" the resource problem, it does not. It is very useful, but you cannot use it blindly when you see a resource-allocation site.

RETAIN_CYCLE

Reported as "Retain Cycle" by pulse.

A retain cycle is a situation when object A retains object B, and object B retains object A at the same time. Here is an example:

@class Child;
@interface Parent : NSObject {
    Child *child; // Instance variables are implicitly __strong
}
@end
@interface Child : NSObject {
    Parent *parent;
}
@end

You can fix a retain cycle in ARC by using __weak variables or weak properties for your "back links", i.e. links to direct or indirect parents in an object hierarchy:

@class Child;
@interface Parent : NSObject {
    Child *child;
}
@end
@interface Child : NSObject {
    __weak Parent *parent;
}
@end

SCOPE_LEAKAGE

Reported as "Scope Leakage" by scope-leakage.

This issue type indicates that a class with scope annotation A stores a field with whose (dynamic) type (or one of its super types) is annotated with scope B such that a scope nesting restriction is violated. By "stores", we mean either directly or transitively.

A configuration is used to list the set of scopes and the must-not-hold relation.

In the following Java example, the set of scopes is Outer and Inner, and the must-not-hold relation is simply {(Outer, Inner)}:

@ScopeType(value = Outer.class)
class ClassOfOuterScope {
  final ClassOfInner c = new ClassOfInner(); // <-- warn here that ClassOfInner would leak.
}

@ScopeType(value = Inner.class)
class ClassOfInner {}

Here is a more detailed description of the analysis.

This analysis operates over Java bytecode. It assumes that types (classes, interfaces, enums, etc.) may be annotated with so-called scope annotations. The analysis is parameterized by a set of scopes and a "must-not-hold" relation over pairs of scopes, which it reads from a configuration file.

The analysis aims to detect violations of the following property: if there exist a path of fields from object OA to object OB and the type of OA (or one of its super-types) is annotated with scope SA and the type of OB (or one of its super-types) is annotated with scope SB then must-not-hold(SA, SB) must be false. Intuitively, the given objects have different scopes that should not be nested, for example, different intended lifetimes, and a forbidden path from OA to OB results in OB "leaking" out of the scope SA.

The implementation reads a configuration to determine a list of (scope) "generators" for each type of scope and a scope class for each type of scope. A generator for a scope type SA is given by the name of a class and a list of methods where it is understood that any of the methods listed for the given class returns an object that is known to have scope SA. (This can be seen as a form of lightweight modeling.) A scope class is the name of the class that represents a given scope.

SENSITIVE_DATA_FLOW

Reported as "Sensitive Data Flow" by pulse.

A flow of sensitive data was detected from a source.

SHELL_INJECTION

Reported as "Shell Injection" by quandary.

Environment variable or file data flowing to shell.

SHELL_INJECTION_RISK

Reported as "Shell Injection Risk" by quandary.

Code injection if the caller of the endpoint doesn't sanitize on its end.

SQL_INJECTION

Reported as "Sql Injection" by quandary.

Untrusted and unescaped data flows to SQL.

SQL_INJECTION_RISK

Reported as "Sql Injection Risk" by quandary.

Untrusted and unescaped data flows to SQL.

STACK_VARIABLE_ADDRESS_ESCAPE

Reported as "Stack Variable Address Escape" by pulse.

Reported when an address pointing into the stack of the current function will escape to its calling context. Such addresses will become invalid by the time the function actually returns so are potentially dangerous.

For example, directly returning a pointer to a local variable:

int* foo() {
   int x = 42;
   return &x; // <-- warn here that "&x" will escape
}

STARVATION

Reported as "UI Thread Starvation" by starvation.

This error is reported in Java, and specifically on Android. These reports are triggered when a method that runs on the UI thread may block, thus potentially leading to an Application Not Responding error.

Infer considers a method as running on the UI thread whenever:

• The method, one of its overrides, its class, or an ancestral class, is annotated with @UiThread.
• The method, or one of its overrides is annotated with @OnEvent, @OnClick, etc.
• The method or its callees call a Litho.ThreadUtils method such as assertMainThread.

The issue is reported when a method deemed to run on the UI thread

• Makes a method call which may block.
• Takes a lock, and another thread takes the same lock, and before releasing it, makes a call that may block.

Calls that may block are considered:

• Certain I/O calls.
• Two way Binder.transact calls.
• Certain OS calls.
• Future or AsyncTask calls to get without timeouts, or with too large timeouts.

To suppress starvation reports in a method m() use the @SuppressLint("STARVATION") annotation, as follows:

  import android.annotation.SuppressLint;

  @SuppressLint("STARVATION")
  public void m() {
  ...
  }

To signal to Infer that a method does not perform any blocking calls, despite appearences, you can use the @NonBlocking annotation:

  import com.facebook.infer.annotation.NonBlocking;

  @NonBlocking
  public void m() {
  ...
  }

This instructs Infer to filter out any potentially blocking calls in m() (also, transitively), and thus any other method can expect no starvation reports due to a call to m(). You will need to set up your class path appropriately to include the JAR files in infer/annotations for this annotation to work.

STATIC_INITIALIZATION_ORDER_FIASCO

Reported as "Static Initialization Order Fiasco" by siof.

This error is reported in C++. It fires when the initialization of a static variable A, accesses a static variable B from another translation unit (usually another .cpp file). There are no guarantees whether B has been already initialized or not at that point.

For more technical definition and techniques to avoid/remediate, see the FAQ.

STRICT_MODE_VIOLATION

Reported as "Strict Mode Violation" by starvation.

Android has a feature called strict mode, which if enabled, will flag the occasions where the main thread makes a call that results in disk I/O, waiting on a network socket, etc. The analysis catching starvation errors and deadlocks (the --starvation analysis) has the ability to statically detect such violations.

To suppress this warning, it's enough to annotate the offending method with @SuppressLint("STRICT_MODE_VIOLATION").

STRONG_SELF_NOT_CHECKED

Reported as "StrongSelf Not Checked" by self-in-block.

This checks reports a potential issue when a block captures weakSelf (a weak pointer to self), then one assigns this pointer to a local variable strongSelf inside the block and uses this variable without checking first whether it is nil. The problem here is that the weak pointer could be nil at the time when the block is executed. So, the correct usage is to first check whether strongSelf is a valid pointer, and then use it.

Example:

__weak __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;
  int (^my_block)() = ^() {
    __strong __typeof(weakSelf) strongSelf = weakSelf;
    int y = strongSelf->x;
    ...

Action: Add a check for nil:

__weak __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;
  int (^my_block)() = ^() {
    __strong __typeof(weakSelf) strongSelf = weakSelf;
    if (strongSelf) {
      int y = strongSelf->x;
      ...
    }

Limitations: To keep this check simple and intra-procedural, we rely on names to find weakSelf: we assume that any captured weak pointer whose name contains "self" is a weak reference to self. In contrast, strongSelf is a local variable to the block, so the check supports any name given to a local strong pointer that has been assigned weakSelf.

TAINT_ERROR

Reported as "Taint Error" by pulse.

A taint flow was detected from a source to a sink

THREAD_SAFETY_VIOLATION

Reported as "Thread Safety Violation" by racerd.

This warning indicates a potential data race in Java. The analyser is called RacerD and this section gives brief but a mostly complete description of its features. See the RacerD page for more in-depth information and examples.

Thread-safety: What is a data race

Here a data race is a pair of accesses to the same member field such that:

• at least one is a write, and,
• at least one occurs without any lock synchronization, and,
• the two accesses occur on threads (if known) which can run in parallel.

Thread-safety: Potential fixes

• Synchronizing the accesses (using the synchronized keyword, thread-exclusion such as atomic objects, volatile etc).
• Making an offending method private -- this will exclude it from being checked at the top level, though it will be checked if called by a public method which may itself, e.g., hold a lock when calling it.
• Putting the two accesses on the same thread, e.g., by using @MainThread or @ThreadConfined.

Thread-safety: Conditions checked before reporting

The class and method are not marked @ThreadSafe(enableChecks = false), and,

• The method is declared synchronized, or employs (non-transitively) locking, or,
• The class is not marked @NotThreadSafe, and,
  • The class/method is marked @ThreadSafe, or one of the configured synonyms in .inferconfig, or,
  • A parent class, or an override method are marked with the above annotations.

NB currently RacerD does not take into account @GuardedBy.

Thread-safety: Thread annotations recognized by RacerD

These class and method annotations imply the method is on the main thread: @MainThread, @UiThread

These method annotations imply the method is on the main thread: @OnBind, @OnEvent, @OnMount, @OnUnbind, @OnUnmount

Both classes of annotations work through the inheritance tree (i.e. if a parent class or method is marked with one of these annotations, so is the child class / method override).

In addition to these, RacerD recognizes many lifecycle methods as necessarily running on the main thread, eg Fragment.onCreate etc.

Finally, the thread status of being on the main thread propagates backwards through the call graph (ie if foo calls bar and bar is marked @UiThtread then foo is automatically considered on the main thread too). Calling assertMainThread, assertOnUiThread, checkOnMainThread has the same effect.

NB RacerD currently does not recognize @WorkerThread, @BinderThread or @AnyThread.

Thread-safety: Other annotations and what they do

These annotations can be found at com.facebook.infer.annotation.*.

• @Functional This is a method annotation indicating the method always returns the same value. When a method foo is annotated @Functional, RacerD will ignore any writes of the return value of foo. For example, in this.x = foo(), the write to this.x is ignored. The reasoning is that if the method returns the same value whenever it's called, any data race on this.x is benign, if that is the only write.

• @ThreadConfined This is a class/method/field annotation which takes a single parameter which can be UI, ANY or a user chosen string. It indicates to RacerD a thread identifier for the class/method/field. Thus, @ThreadConfined(UI) is equivalent to @UiThread, and @ThreadConfined(ANY) is equivalent to not having the annotation at all, for classes and methods. When this annotation is applied to a field it instructs Infer to assume (without checking) that all accesses to that field are made on the same thread (and can, therefore, not race by definition). The intention is that RacerD uses that to detect exclusion between accesses occurring on the same thread. However, only the UI thread is supported at this time, and any user provided value is considered equal to UI.

• @VisibleForTesting A method annotation making Infer consider the method as effectively private. This means it will not be checked for races against other non-private methods of the class, but only if called by one.

• @ReturnsOwnership A method annotation indicating that the method returns a freshly owned object. Accesses to the returned value will not be considered for data races, as the object is in-effect unique and not accessible yet from other threads. The main utility of this annotation is in interfaces, where Infer cannot look up the implementation and decide for itself.

TOPL_ERROR

Reported as "Topl Error" by topl.

A violation of a Topl property (user-specified). There is an execution path in the code that drives a Topl property from a start state to an error state.

This indicates that the code has a user-defined undesired behavior.

See Topl for an example

TOPL_ERROR_LATENT

Reported as "Topl Error Latent" by topl.

A latent TOPL_ERROR. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

UNTRUSTED_BUFFER_ACCESS

Reported as "Untrusted Buffer Access" by quandary.

Untrusted data of any kind flowing to buffer.

UNTRUSTED_DESERIALIZATION

Reported as "Untrusted Deserialization" by quandary.

User-controlled deserialization.

UNTRUSTED_DESERIALIZATION_RISK

Reported as "Untrusted Deserialization Risk" by quandary.

User-controlled deserialization

UNTRUSTED_ENVIRONMENT_CHANGE_RISK

Reported as "Untrusted Environment Change Risk" by quandary.

User-controlled environment mutation.

UNTRUSTED_FILE

Reported as "Untrusted File" by quandary.

User-controlled file creation; may be vulnerable to path traversal and more.

UNTRUSTED_FILE_RISK

Reported as "Untrusted File Risk" by quandary.

User-controlled file creation; may be vulnerable to path traversal and more.

UNTRUSTED_HEAP_ALLOCATION

Reported as "Untrusted Heap Allocation" by quandary.

Untrusted data of any kind flowing to heap allocation. this can cause crashes or DOS.

UNTRUSTED_INTENT_CREATION

Reported as "Untrusted Intent Creation" by quandary.

Creating an Intent from user-controlled data.

UNTRUSTED_URL_RISK

Reported as "Untrusted Url Risk" by quandary.

Untrusted flag, environment variable, or file data flowing to URL.

UNTRUSTED_VARIABLE_LENGTH_ARRAY

Reported as "Untrusted Variable Length Array" by quandary.

Untrusted data of any kind flowing to stack buffer allocation. Trying to allocate a stack buffer that's too large will cause a stack overflow.

USER_CONTROLLED_SQL_RISK

Reported as "User Controlled Sql Risk" by quandary.

Untrusted data flows to SQL (no injection risk).

USE_AFTER_DELETE

Reported as "Use After Delete" by pulse.

An address that was invalidated by a call to delete in C++ is dereferenced.

USE_AFTER_DELETE_LATENT

Reported as "Use After Delete Latent" by pulse.

A latent USE_AFTER_DELETE. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

USE_AFTER_FREE

Reported as "Use After Free" by pulse.

An address that was invalidated by a call to free in C is dereferenced.

USE_AFTER_FREE_LATENT

Reported as "Use After Free Latent" by pulse.

A latent USE_AFTER_FREE. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

USE_AFTER_LIFETIME

Reported as "Use After Lifetime" by pulse.

The lifetime of an object has ended but that object is being accessed. For example, the address of a variable holding a C++ object is accessed after the variable has gone out of scope:

void foo() {
     X* p;
     { // new scope
       X x = X();
       p = &x;
     } // x has gone out of scope
     p->method(); // ERROR: you should not access *p after x has gone out of scope
}

USE_AFTER_LIFETIME_LATENT

Reported as "Use After Lifetime Latent" by pulse.

A latent USE_AFTER_LIFETIME. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

VECTOR_INVALIDATION

Reported as "Vector Invalidation" by pulse.

An address pointing into a C++ std::vector might have become invalid. This can happen when an address is taken into a vector, then the vector is mutated in a way that might invalidate the address, for example by adding elements to the vector, which might trigger a re-allocation of the entire vector contents (thereby invalidating the pointers into the previous location of the contents).

For example:

void deref_vector_element_after_push_back_bad(std::vector<int>& vec) {
  int* elt = &vec[1];
  vec.push_back(42); // if the array backing the vector was full already, this
                     // will re-allocate it and copy the previous contents
                     // into the new array, then delete the previous array
  std::cout << *y << "\n"; // bad: elt might be invalid
}

VECTOR_INVALIDATION_LATENT

Reported as "Vector Invalidation Latent" by pulse.

A latent VECTOR_INVALIDATION. See the documentation on Pulse latent issues.

WEAK_SELF_IN_NO_ESCAPE_BLOCK

Reported as "Weak Self In No Escape Block" by self-in-block.

This check reports when weakSelf (a weak pointer to self) is used in a block, and this block is passed to a "no escaping" method. This means that the block passed to that method won't be leaving the current scope, this is marked with the annotation NS_NOESCAPE.

The issue here is that, because the block is "no escaping", there is no need to use weakSelf and strongSelf but we can just use self. This has the advantage of not needing to deal with the added complexity of weak pointers, and it simplifies the code.

Example:

  __weak __typeof(self) weakSelf = self;
  [self foo:^() { //foo's first parameter is annotates with `NS_NOESCAPE`
      [weakSelf bar];
  }];

Action:

Replace weakSelf with self:

  [self foo:^() {
      [self bar];
  }];

Limitations: To keep this check simple and intra-procedural, we rely on names to find weakSelf: we assume that any captured weak pointer whose name contains "self" is a weak reference to self.